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Jocelyn Stacey*  The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern
 Environmental Assessment Law
Environmental assessment (EA) is a cornerstone of environmental law. It provides 
a legal framework for public decision-making about major development projects 
with implications for environmental protection and the rights and title of Indigenous 
Peoples. Despite significant literature supporting deliberation as the preferred mode 
of engagement with those affected by EA decisions, the specific legal demands of EA 
legislation remain undeveloped. This article suggests a legal foundation for deliberative 
environmental assessment. It argues that modern EA can be understood through three 
public law frames: procedural fairness, public inquiry, and the framework for the duty to 
consult and accommodate. It further argues that these three public law frames share 
features of deliberative decision-making that can and should inform the implementation 
and interpretation of new design features in British Columbia and Canada’s reformed 
EA legislation.
L’évaluation environnementale est une pierre angulaire du droit de l’environnement. Elle 
fournit un cadre juridique pour la prise de décisions par les instances publiques relatives 
aux grands projets de développement ayant des conséquences pour la protection de 
l’environnement et les droits et titres des peuples autochtones. Malgré l’existence d’une 
importante littérature soutenant que la consultation et la délibération constituent le 
mode d’engagement privilégié avec les personnes visées par les décisions touchant les 
évaluations environnementales, les exigences juridiques spécifiques de la législation 
en matière d’évaluation environnementale restent peu développées. Le présent article 
propose un fondement juridique pour l’évaluation environnementale délibérative. Il 
fait valoir que l’évaluation environnementale moderne peut être comprise à la lumière 
de trois cadres de droit public : l’équité procédurale, l’enquête publique et l’obligation 
de consulter et d’accommoder. Il fait également valoir que ces trois cadres de droit 
public partagent des caractéristiques de la prise de décision délibérative qui peuvent et 
doivent éclairer la mise en œuvre et l’interprétation des nouvelles caractéristiques de 
la législation sur l’évaluation environnementale en Colombie-Britannique et au Canada.
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on an early draft; and the excellent feedback from the anonymous reviewers. This article benefited 
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Introduction
Environmental assessment (EA) law provides the legal framework for 
deciding whether, and how, controversial development projects proceed in 
light of their anticipated impacts on the environment and constitutionally-
protected Aboriginal and treaty rights. The social, environmental, and 
economic stakes of decisions about pipelines, hydroelectric dams, or 
heavy metal mines, for example, are identified, assessed, and adjudicated 
through EA law. 
The stakes of most EA decisions are enormous. The enduring 
challenge of EA legislation is to provide a framework that allows for 
these stakes to be assessed, understood, and addressed in a democratically 
legitimate manner. Environmental law scholars have analogized EA to 
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Magna Carta1 for the environment and argued it is “quasi-constitutional” 
in nature because of the vital role it plays in generating publicly justified 
decisions.2 EA scholarship, by and large, resolves this challenge in favour 
of a deliberative model of EA3; that is, a set of requirements that fosters 
robust exchange and mutual learning amongst those affected by the project 
proposal (industry proponents, government agencies, local communities, 
Indigenous Nations, the public generally). 
The model of deliberative EA has not, however, translated to the 
implementation and interpretation of Canadian EA legislation. Perhaps 
because of the unique, technical, and complex structure of EA legislation, 
its deliberative potential remains unfulfilled. As explained below, when 
decisions are judicially reviewed, the courts seem to understand EA 
legislation as requiring a wholly technical process and/or generating a 
wholly political decision. Case law has yet to elucidate the deliberative 
qualities latent in EA law, missing the connection between deliberation 
and the rule of law and the potential for deliberation to better achieve 
EA’s legislated objectives of sustainable development and environmental 
protection. In other words, deliberative EA in the Canadian context is 
largely understood as an aspirational policy goal. This understanding 
misses its essential Canadian public law context, namely, the duty of 
fairness, public inquiries, and the duty to consult and accommodate 
Aboriginal Peoples (DCA). 
Recent legislative changes to EA provide a timely illustration of the 
need to clarify the public law dimensions of modern EA law. Both BC and 
Canada have undertaken significant law reform efforts to “revitalize”4 EA 
legislation and “restore public trust.”5 Both governments have committed 
to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP), which contains an obligation on States to “consult 
1. Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental Impact Assessment: ‘Setting the Law Ablaze’” in Douglas 
Fisher, ed, Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2016) 422 at 422, 426 [Fisher, “Setting the Law Ablaze”]  (citing to William H Rodgers, 
“The Most Creative Moments in the History of US Environmental Law: ‘The Whats’” [2000] U Ill L 
Rev 1 at 31).
2. Jocelyn Stacey, “The Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s 
Environmental Assessment Legacy” (2016) 21:2 Rev Const Stud 165 [Stacey, “Legacy”].
3. See Part I-2, infra.
4. Environmental Assessment Revitalization Intentions Paper (Victoria: Government of British 
Columbia, 2018), Government of British Columbia at 3, online (pdf): <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/
assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/environmental-assessments/environmental-
assessment-revitalization/documents/ea_revitalization_intentions_paper.pdf> [https://perma.cc/
T25J-4FSD] [BC Intentions Paper].
5. Minister of Environment and Climate Change Mandate Letter (12 November 2015), Government 
of Canada, online: <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-environment-and-climate-change-mandate-letter>.
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and cooperate in good faith with the [I]ndigenous [P]eoples concerned 
…in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval 
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources.”6 In 
line with these commitments, BC and Canada’s reformed statutes contain 
new design features: opportunities for early public involvement, the 
incorporation of community knowledge, and a recognition of Indigenous 
jurisdiction, which, in BC, includes consensus-seeking obligations on 
provincial officials. These are laudable developments. But they increase 
the complexity of EA regimes, further compounding the risk that EA’s 
connections to more familiar public law frames will remain obscured.
This article defends a legal foundation for deliberative EA. It argues 
that modern EA can be understood through three public law frames: 
procedural fairness, public inquiry, and the DCA. It shows how these 
public law frames contain essential conditions for deliberation. The article 
argues that each frame—albeit implicitly and incompletely—recognizes 
the responsible agency of those affected, fosters mutual respect through 
participatory processes, and requires decision-makers to be reflexive in 
their decisions. In other words, each frame contains conditions that, when 
fulfilled, can generate publicly justified decisions in accordance with the 
rule of law. 
Before outlining the article’s structure, a caveat is needed on its 
approach to the DCA. The DCA is a constitutional obligation that exists 
independently of EA law. Yet, as this article details, EA law plays a 
significant role in implementing the DCA. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) has furnished the DCA with the contents of Canadian 
administrative law, drawing on common law notions of participatory 
rights.7 The article’s purpose is not to propose incremental reforms to the 
DCA, although that may be one effect. Reforms to the DCA must address 
the concerns of Indigenous communities, Indigenous scholars, and 
their allies who are clear that, as currently conceived and implemented, 
the DCA fails to meet international norms and continues the project of 
colonization.8 This article takes an internal approach to the DCA to show 
6. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, UNGA A/
RES/61/295 at Article 32(2), subject to the limitations in Article 46; BC Intentions Paper, supra note 
4 at 8.
7. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 41 [Haida]; 
Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at paras 46-47.
8. Gordon Christie, “Developing Case Law: The Future of Consultation and Accommodation” 
(2006) 39:1 UBC L Rev 139; Robert Hamilton & Joshua Nichols, “The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa 
Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult” (2019) 56:3 Alta L Rev 729; Bruce McIvor, First 
Peoples Law: Essays on Canadian Law and Decolonization, 3rd ed (First Peoples Law, 2018) at 69-
77; Erin Hanson, Coast Salish Law and Jurisdiction over Natural Resources: A Case Study with the 
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that it is an instance in which Canadian courts have actively developed 
deliberative conditions within a Canadian public law framework, even if 
courts are unwilling to give those conditions their full effect. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the basic structure 
of EA law in BC and Canada, identifying the legal challenge posed by 
existing judicial interpretation of EA legislation. It then turns to the case 
for deliberative EA and explains why this theoretical framing enjoys such 
support in the EA literature. Drawing from existing scholarship on the 
relationship between law and deliberative democracy, it highlights three 
conditions that must be in place for the law to support deliberative decision-
making: recognition of the responsible agency of those affected, mutual 
respect, and reflexivity. Part II explains modern EA practice through three 
public law frames: (1) EA as procedural fairness for the public, (2) EA 
as public inquiry in miniature, and (3) EA as statutory framework for the 
DCA. Part II takes each of these public law frames and identifies within 
them the three essential conditions for deliberative decision-making. Part 
III of the article offers an example of how a deliberative understanding 
of these three frames can elucidate a new feature in BC and Canada’s 
reformed EA legislation. Using the planning phase/early engagement 
stage as an example, it highlights how this reform blends and extends upon 
the three public law frames. It then identifies how the three deliberative 
conditions can guide its implementation and interpretation going forward.
I. Environmental assessment law and the duty to consult and 
accommodate in Canada
1. The basics of EA and the DCA
EA is a decision-making procedure that requires the identification, 
consideration, and prevention of environmental harm before it happens. EA 
has a planning function in that it involves the assessment of interconnected 
environmental issues as well as economic, social, and cultural concerns. 
The SCC has described EA as “a planning tool that is now generally 
regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making.”9 EA 
legislation is a central feature of Canadian environmental law. EAs are a 
Tsleil-Waututh Nation (MA Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2018) [unpublished]; Bryn Gray, 
“Building Relationships and Advancing Reconciliation through Meaningful Consultation: Report  to 
the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (30 May 2016), online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.
gc.ca/eng/1498765671013/1498765827601> [https://perma.cc/3NZC-XPFW].
9. Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at 71, 88 
DLR (4th) 1 [Oldman].
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legal prerequisite to government approval of major development projects 
and are also used to inform policy formation and regional development.10 
In Canada, EA is one of the few sites in which the risks and benefits of 
environmental and social impacts inform environmental decision-making 
in a transparent manner.11 The assessment of these risks and benefits can 
sometimes lead to project proposals being rejected; however, the focus 
is typically on alterations, mitigation measures, and conditions that can 
prevent some environmental harms while still allowing the project to 
proceed.12 Once project proposals receive an EA approval, they must be 
constructed, operated, and decommissioned in accordance with applicable 
regulatory regimes (eg mining law, fisheries law).
The DCA is also an integral component of Crown decision-making in 
Canada. The DCA flows from the honour of the Crown, which requires that 
the Crown act honourably in all its dealings with Indigenous Peoples.13 As 
articulated by the SCC in Haida and subsequent decisions, the DCA is 
engaged when the Crown contemplates action that may adversely impact 
Aboriginal or treaty rights.14 Approving a development project by granting 
an EA permit is Crown conduct that virtually always engages the DCA, 
given the geography of Canada, traditional and ongoing land use and 
governance, and the interconnected nature of environmental impacts. As 
explained in Part II-3 below, EA and the DCA have been intertwined in 
practice for some time. 
The SCC has recognized that both EA and the DCA have a vital role 
in ensuring decisions are made in the public interest. In Clyde River, the 
Court stated that “the duty to consult, being a constitutional imperative, 
gives rise to a special public interest that supersedes other concerns.”15 The 
Court has also identified environmental protection as a “public purpose of 
10. Though these latter EA tools are better developed elsewhere: see, eg, Barry Dalal-Clayton & 
Barry Sadler, Strategic Environmental Assessment: A Sourcebook and Reference Guide to International 
Experience (London: Earthscan, 2005).
11. Stacey, “Legacy,” supra note 2 at 171; David R Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian 
Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 233, 244-248.
12. Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process—A Guide and Critique 
(Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 25 (summarizing effective, efficient and fair EA).
13. Haida, supra note 7 at paras 16-17.
14. Ibid at para 35; Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at paras 25, 
29 [CR]. 
15. CR, supra note 14 at para 40 (citing to Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 
SCC 43 at para 70 [CS]).
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superordinate importance”16 and that understanding the “consequences… 
from environmental change are integral to decision-making.”17
EA is thus a crucial point for government decision-makers to 
engage with individuals and communities who will be affected by major 
development decisions. This engagement is essential to making decisions 
about land, water, resources, etc, that not only comply with legislative 
requirements in a formal sense but also have the qualities of democratic and 
legal authority. Some have described EA as something like Magna Carta 
for the environmental context, observing that “just like that document, it is 
an official statement of the principles of governance, and accordingly it is 
an articulation of a good society.”18 
Recent legislative reform to EA in BC and at the federal level enhance 
the obligations of decision-makers to engage meaningfully with those 
affected. For example, the reformed legislation contains three design 
features that do not easily map onto pre-existing modes of engagement. 
Both statutes contain a planning stage, which creates a process for 
engagement to determine the plan for the subsequent EA.19 Both statutes 
require inclusion of community knowledge,20 blurring the lines between 
process and substance and citizen and expert. Both statutes recognize 
Indigenous jurisdiction,21 and BC’s legislation recognizes a consensus-
seeking obligation on the agency and ministers who implement the Act.22 
These are all laudable reforms with the potential to significantly 
improve or rectify failures of their predecessors.23 The challenge is that 
the specific legal contours of EA’s requirements for engaging with those 
affected are undeveloped. Despite detailed legislation setting out EA 
requirements and standards, the dominant judicial characterization of 
EA decisions is as either “essentially political in nature”24 or as scientific 
16. R v HydroQuébec, [1997] 3 SCR 213 at para 85. See also Ontario	v	Canadian	Pacific	Ltd, [1995] 
SCR 1031 at para 55.
17. Oldman, supra note 9 at 37.
18. Supra note 1.
19. The “planning phase” at the federal level: Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, ss 10-15 [IAA]. 
Early engagement under the BC legislation: Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2018, c 51, ss 13-18 
[EAA].  
20. IAA, supra note 19, ss 6((1)(j), 22(1)(m); EAA, supra note 19, s 2(2)(a).
21. IAA, supra note 19, s 2; EAA, supra note 19, s 2(2)(b)(ii)(b).
22. EAA, supra note 19, ss 16(1), 19(1), 27(5), 28(3), 29(3).
23. For critique of the past iteration of federal EA see eg Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of 
Federal EA as We Know it?” (2012) 24:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1; Robert B Gibson, “In Full Retreat: The 
Canadian Government’s New Environmental Assessment Law Undoes Decades of Progress” (2012) 
30:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 179 [Gibson, “In Full Retreat”].
24. Peace Valley Landowner Assn v British Columbia (Minister of Environment), 2016 BCCA 377 
at para 29; RK Heli-Ski Panorama Inc v Jumbo Glacier Resort Project (Project Assessment Director), 
2007 BCCA 9 at para 30; Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at para 154 [Gitxaala]; Peace 
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exercises not subject to review by the court.25 Despite judicial assurances 
that fair procedure is the “handmaiden of justice,”26 Canadian courts have 
been reluctant to supervise the implementation of statutory EA procedures 
in a way that furthers the access to justice objectives of EA legislation.27
These dominant judicial stances on EA legislative requirements 
belie the deliberative features immanent in EA schemes. As the next part 
argues, deliberative EA is not simply a policy aspiration or best practice. 
Deliberative EA is, rather, the model for exercising public authority over 
the environment in a way that accords with both democratic and rule of 
law requirements. 
2. Deliberative EA and public authority
Deliberation is defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing 
reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to 
revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims 
made by fellow participants.”28 Deliberation as a mode of exchange 
differs from bargaining (in which parties advance purely self-interested 
positions) and rhetoric, though it may involve bits of both.29 As described 
below, deliberation is the manner of interaction supported by theories of 
deliberative democracy.30 Deliberative democrats champion the capacity 
of citizens to contribute to collective decisions “at every stage of policy 
formation.”31
Valley Landowner Assn v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1027 at para 68.
25. The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal’s platitude about courts not being academies of 
science is particularly relevant here: Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 
186 at paras 126-130; Inverhuron & District Ratepayers’ Assn v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 
[2000] FCJ No 682, 2000 CarswellNat 5474 at para 47. But see Pembina Institute for Appropriate 
Development v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302 at paras 72-73.
26. See eg Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 129; Gagne v British Columbia 
(Director, Environmental Management), 2014 BCSC 2077 at para 46; Clifford	v	Ontario	(Attorney	
General), 2009 ONCA 670 at para 23; Maritime Broadcasting System Ltd v Canadian Media Guild, 
2014 FCA 59 at para 129.
27. VAPOR v British Columbia (Environment), 2015 BCSC 1086 at para 93; Mary Liston, “Expanding 
the Parameters of Participatory Public Law: A Democratic Right to Public Participation and the State’s 
Duty of Public Consultation” (2017) 63:2 McGill LJ 375 at 411-415 [Liston, “Democracy”].
28. Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory” (2003) 6:1 Annual Rev Political Science 
307 at 309 [Chambers]. 
29. Francesca Polletta & Beth Gharrity Gardner, “The Forms of Deliberative Communication” in 
André Bächtiger, John S Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge & Mark E Warren, eds, The Oxford Handbook of 
Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 70 at 71-72.
30. Note that the focus of this article is on the potential for government-led decisions to be more in 
line with the conditions of deliberative democracy. This frame of state decision-making narrows the 
range of deliberative possibilities. Deliberative democrats note that the radical and critical potential in 
deliberative democracy typically lies outside state institutions in the public sphere.
31. Chambers, supra note 28 at 317. 
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EA scholarship contains much support for deliberative EA. Neil Craik, 
for example, describes deliberative EA as:
developing and inculcating shared values around environmental 
decisions.…The substantive goals that underlie EIA [environmental 
impact assessment] are understood to be more than symbolic and of 
instrumental value, since the participants are required to justify their 
positions considering the available information, public comments and 
the environmental objectives of EIA.32
On this view, through the integration of community participation and 
technical expertise, participants come to understand the significance of 
anticipated effects and they “may reconsider their interests in light of both 
factual and normative information.”33 Many scholars see deliberation as 
essential for sustainable decision-making because it provides for social 
learning that can dislodge unsustainable assumptions.34 Moreover, 
deliberative participation in EA is understood as an exercise in citizenship, 
which both builds democratic capacity and provides democratic authority 
to decisions with significant public impacts.35 
Deliberative decision-making is typically situated within theories 
of deliberative democracy, which foreground public reason (rather than 
preference-aggregation) in democracies.36 A key marker of deliberative 
32. Neil Craik, “The Assessment of Environmental Impact” in Emma Lees & Jorge E Viñuales, 
eds, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019) 876 at 882 [Craik, “Assessment”]. Writing about Australia, Fisher observes: “EIA was one 
of the tools developed to ensure that ‘the deliberative obligation’ is discharged.” Elizabeth Fisher, 
Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 
2007) at 129 (footnotes omitted); see also Hans Wiklund “In Search of Arenas for Democratic 
Deliberation: a Habermasian Review of Environmental Assessment” (2005) 23:4 Impact Assessment 
& Project Appraisal 281; A John Sinclair & Alan P Diduck, “Reconceptualizing Public Participation in 
Environmental Assessment as EA Civics” (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 174; Neil 
Craik, “Process and Reconciliation: Integrating the Duty to Consult with Environmental Assessment” 
(2016) 53:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 632 at 673-674 [Craik “Reconciliation”]; Jane Holder, Environmental 
Assessment: The Regulation of Decision Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 27-29; 
John R Parkins, “Deliberative Democracy, Institution Building, and the Pragmatics of Cumulative 
Effects Assessment” (2011) 16:3 Ecology & Society 30.
33. Craik, “Assessment,” supra note 32 at 882; Holder, supra note 32 at 28.
34. A John Sinclair, Alan Diduck & Patricia Fitzpatrick, “Conceptualizing Learning for Sustainability 
Through Environmental Assessment: Critical Reflections on 15 Years of Research” (2008) 28:7 
Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 415 at 425. Deliberative environmental decision-making 
outside the EA context also has significant support: see eg John S Dryzek & Jonathan Pickering, 
“Deliberation as a Catalyst for Reflexive Environmental Governance” (2017) 131 Ecological 
Economics 353; Jenny Steele, “Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a 
Problem-solving Approach” (2001) 21:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 415.
35. Ciaran O’Fairchaeallaigh, “Public Participation and Environmental Impact Assessment: 
Purposes, Implications, and Lessons for Public Policy Making” (2010) 30:1 Environmental Impact 
Assessment Rev 19 at 22.
36. It contrasts with aggregative democracy, through which public decisions gain legitimacy through 
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democratic decision-making is the giving and receiving of public-
regarding reasons for public decisions.37 Thus a good outcome for public 
decision-making, from this perspective, is a decision that is justified 
through accessible and reasonable reasons to those who are subject to its 
effects.38 Deliberation is a mode of decision-making in which process and 
substance are fused. As leading scholars of deliberative democracy put it: 
“What reasons count as such a justification is inescapably a substantive 
question.”39 
Deliberative democrats argue that deliberation enhances legitimacy, 
encourages public-regarding perspectives by participants, promotes mutual 
respect, and improves the quality of decisions.40 Building on these insights, 
public law scholars argue that the exercise of public authority in a manner 
that accords with deliberative-democratic principles is tied to legality.41 
Deliberative decision-making thus explains how the administrative state 
can operate with both democratic and legal authority.
From the scholarship on deliberative democracy, we can identify 
three conditions that must be met to foster deliberative decision-making.42 
The first is recognition that those affected have the capacity to contribute 
to decisions affecting their interests; in other words, it is recognition of 
their responsible agency.43 Individuals and communities are not passive 
recipients of commands, rather they have agency with respect to collective 
decisions. Their agency is respected when they can participate in the 
debate and discussion about decisions that impact their interests. It is 
further recognized when they have opportunities to contest (or accept) 
those decisions. 
vote-taking or other forms of aggregating individual preferences: Hoi L Kong, “Election Law and 
Deliberative Democracy: Against Deflation” (2015) 9 JPPL 35 [Kong, “Election”].
37. Jocelyn Stacey, The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency (Oxford and Portland OR: 
Hart Publishing, 2018), Chapter 4 [Stacey, Emergency].
38. A consensus-based outcome is always welcomed, but is not understood as a necessary or even 
likely outcome of democratic deliberation: Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative 
Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 26-29.
39. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, “Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process” (2002) 10:2 J 
Political Philosophy 153 at 156 [Gutmann & Thompson, “Beyond Process”].
40. Chambers, supra note 28 at 316.
41. David Dyzenhaus, “Deliberative Constitutionalism Through the Lens of the Administrative 
State” in Ron Levy, Hoi Kong & Jeff King, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 44; Liston “Democracy,” supra 
note 27; Stacey, Emergency, supra note 37. 
42. From a design perspective these three conditions roughly map onto Fung’s cube of participation: 
Archon Fung, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance” (2006) 66 Public Administrative 
Rev 66.
43. Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford and 
Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2012); Kong, “Election,” supra note 36 at 40. And building off these 
sources: Stacey, Emergency, supra note 37 at 106-107.
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Second, deliberative decision-making requires an understanding of 
mutual respect that flows from the act of deliberation. “To deliberate with 
another is to understand the other as a self-authoring source of reasons 
and claims.”44 Deliberation requires participants to be recognized and 
respected as free and equal participants who ought to give and are entitled 
to receive public-regarding reasons, not entirely self-interested claims.45 
Mutual respect demands that deliberative forums are designed to foster 
free and equal participation. Scholars have written extensively about these 
conditions both in an ideal form46 and in specific cases (eg the design of 
citizen assemblies).47 Mutual respect also requires that participants conduct 
themselves as responsible agents by bringing relevant, public-regarding 
claims. This is how discussion remains “aimed at producing reasonable, 
well-informed opinions.”48
Finally, deliberative decision-making is reflexive.49 Responsible agents 
who respect each other as such are willing to revise preferences. New 
information and different perspectives ought to prompt participants—
including decision-makers—to reconsider and perhaps revise their own 
opinions. The reason-giving requirement means that participants ought 
to be able to articulate how they took that information into account to 
justify their ultimate position. This requirement of reflexivity attaches to 
all participants, but it has a particular importance when dealing with the 
exercise of public authority. Public officials must give reasons to respond 
to the claims made by those affected. Reflexivity respects the responsible 
agency of those subject to the decision.50
These conditions of deliberation thus provide an internal structure for 
publicly justified decisions. In a deliberative democracy, public decision-
makers must seek to fulfill these conditions in the first instance because 
44. Jane Mansbridge et al, “A systemic approach to deliberative democracy” in John Parkinson & 
Jane Mansbridge, eds, Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1 at 11.
45. For a summary of the literature on this point, see Polletta & Gardner, supra note 29 at 71-72. 
On the relevance of this to Canadian public law see Liston “Democracy,” supra note 27 and Stacey, 
Emergency, supra note 37. 
46. Alice Woolley, “Legitimating Public Policy” (2008) 58:2 UTLJ 153; Henry S Richardson, 
Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002); Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in James Bohman & William Rehg, 
eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 73.
47. Chambers, supra note 28 at 316 (and citations therein).
48. Chambers, supra note 28 at 309.
49. Ibid at 308-309; Dryzek & Pickering, supra note 34.
50. Chambers, supra note 28 at 308 and 317; Gutmann & Thompson, “Beyond Process,” supra note 
39 at 156. See also Genevieve Cartier, “Deliberative Ideals and Constitutionalism in the Administrative 
State” in Ron Levy, Hoi Kong, Graeme Orr & Jeff King eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 57 at 62-63.
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this is the source of their democratic and legal authority. When subject 
to review, courts too must attend to these conditions.51 This reconciles 
democratic authority with the rule of law.52 
In sum, deliberative decision-making is supported as a form of 
best practices for EA to improve both the legitimacy and quality of EA 
decisions. Deliberative EA is grounded in a theory of public authority 
that explains how EA decisions made by the administrative state can 
fulfill both democratic and legal requirements. Moreover, this theory can 
be distilled into three conditions that are essential to allow deliberative 
decision-making to unfold.
II. Environmental law’s public law frames and their deliberative 
dimensions
The duty of fairness, early Canadian EA regulation, and the DCA have 
independent origins but all three inform the legislative structure and 
operation of modern EA law. This part explains the connection between 
modern EA and the common law duty of fairness, early EA as public 
inquiry, and the DCA. For each public law frame, it highlights how the 
existing doctrine has recognized the three conditions of deliberation. While 
this recognition is both implicit and incomplete, it nonetheless provides a 
coherent explanation of modern EA and has the potential to significantly, 
and explicitly, inform the implementation and interpretation of modern 
EA law. 
1. Administrative law: The duty of fairness
a. EA as procedural fairness for the public
The first public law frame is the common law duty of fairness. The duty of 
fairness guarantees those affected by a public decision a right to be heard 
by an impartial decision-maker. Elizabeth Fisher writes that EA can be 
understood as ensuring procedural fairness for the public:
The fact that EIA [environmental impact assessment] is a legal procedure 
makes it both legally familiar and legally alien. It is familiar because 
lawyers, particularly administrative lawyers, are well acquainted with 
procedural obligations in the form of natural justice and procedural 
fairness. It is alien because most such procedural obligations are focused 
on protecting individual rights while EIA is a procedure in the public 
51. This is reflected in current Canadian administrative law and its emphasis on justified 
administrative decision-making: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 
SCC 65. See especially paras 2, 14, 74.
52. David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture” 
(1998) 14:1 SAJHR 11 at 36-37.
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interest.53
Fisher’s characterization applies in the Canadian context. While in Canada 
the common law duty of fairness has not been extended to the public 
generally,54 the public’s right to be heard has been a defining feature of 
Canadian EA since its inception.55 Canada’s first EA legislation not only 
allowed for public participation, but it also committed the government to 
actively facilitating such input.56 Every version of federal EA legislation 
has included “meaningful public participation” as one of its purposes.57 For 
major project EAs, public participation has occurred through opportunities 
for written comment at multiple points in the EA process and through 
intervenor status at hearings. The importance of public participation to 
EA is underscored by the significant backlash to 2012 legislative changes, 
which for the first time curtailed the role of public input.58
Like the common law duty of fairness, the role of the public in EA 
is two-fold: instrumental and intrinsic.59 First, members of the public are 
often the source of relevant information about the environment and the 
possible impacts of an approval decision. This information can enhance, 
contest, or clarify the information presented by the project proponent. 
NGOs and members of the public play an essential role in contesting 
proponent evidence and thus provide the decision-maker with a much 
53. Fisher, “Setting the Law Ablaze,” supra note 1 at 425.
54. Liston, “Democracy,” supra note 27. Compare with developments in the UK: R (on the 
application of Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey, [2014] UKSC 56, especially Lord Wilson; 
John Morison, “Citizen Participation: A Critical Look at the Democratic Adequacy of Government 
Consultations” (2017) 37:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 636.
55. A John Sinclair & Alan P Diduck, “Public Participation in Canadian Environmental Assessment: 
Enduring Challenges and Future Directions” in Kevin S Hanna, ed, Environmental Impact Assessment: 
Practice and Participation, 3rd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2016) 65. Though it has 
consistently fallen short of expectations. See Meinhard Doelle & A John Sinclair “Time for a New 
Approach to Public Participation in EA: Promoting Cooperation and Consensus for Sustainability” 
(2006) 26:2 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 185 at 186-187. For a detailed literature review 
of the meaning and role of public participation in EA see: Anne N Glucker et al, “Public Participation 
in Environmental Impact Assessment: Why, Who and How?” (2013) 43 Environmental Impact 
Assessment Rev 104.
56. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, Preamble, ss 4(1)(d), 62(g) [CEAA 
1995].
57. Ibid, s 4(1)(d); Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52, s 4(e); IAA, 
supra note 19, s 6(1)(h).
58. Gibson, “In Full Retreat,” supra note 23 at 180, 183-184; Geoffrey H Salomons & George 
Hoberg, “Setting Boundaries of Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment” (2014) 45 
Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 69; Kirsten Mikadze, “Pipelines and the Changing Face of 
Public Participation” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 83.
59. See eg Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643 at 659-660, 24 DLR (4th) 44 
[Cardinal].
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fuller picture of the assessment.60 Second, the scale of the projects subject 
to EA means that members of the public are affected either directly or 
indirectly by these public decisions. Accordingly, EA affords them a right 
to be heard before a decision is made that affects their interests. This is the 
intrinsic justification for public participation—it recognizes the autonomy 
and agency of those affected.61 The instrumental and intrinsic justifications 
for participation are often captured by the language of legitimacy.62 When 
EA functions well through a fair process, it contributes to the legitimacy of 
development project decisions. Similarly, and independent of any effect on 
the substantive outcome, the duty of fairness contributes to the legitimacy 
of the administrative process.63
These similarities suggest that understanding EA as procedural fairness 
for the public is an apt way of explaining the unusual structure of EA 
and the elusive content of legislative provisions prescribing engagement 
with affected communities. As the next section shows, watershed judicial 
decisions on the common law duty of fairness contain the deliberative 
conditions delineated above. 
b. Deliberative conditions in the duty of fairness
This part examines the common law duty of fairness exemplified in the 
UK decision in Cooper v Board of Works64 and the leading SCC decision 
in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).65 Cooper is 
an 1863 Court of Common Pleas decision that is said to foreshadow the 
Canadian duty of fairness by over a century.66 In Baker, the SCC solidified 
the doctrine of the duty of fairness and, in doing so, supplied a remarkably 
stable precedent for this area of administrative law.
The facts of Cooper are simple. The Board of Works ordered the 
demolition of Cooper’s partially-built home without affording Cooper any 
notice or opportunity to be heard before making the decision. Cooper was 
notified of the decision only upon discovering his demolished home. The 
60. Susan Rutherford & Karen Campbell, “Time Well Spent? A Survey of Public Participation in 
Federal Environmental Assessment Panels” (2004) 15:1 J Envtl L & Prac 71.
61. Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) at 185-186. 
62. Sinclair & Diduck, supra note 55 at 65; Mark Winfield, “Decision-Making, Governance and 
Sustainability: Beyond the Age of ‘Responsible Resource Development’” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 
129.
63. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 1999 SCC 699 at para 22, 174 DLR 
(4th) 193 [Baker]; Cardinal, supra note 59 at 661.
64. Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 CB (NS) 180, 143 ER 414 [Cooper].
65. Baker, supra note 63.
66. Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman, David Mullan & Janna Promislow eds, Administrative Law: 
Cases, Text, and Materials 7th ed (Toronto: Emond Publishing, 2015) at 74.
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relevant legislation required that persons provide the Board notice before 
building a new home; Cooper claimed he provided notice. The Board 
claimed that Cooper did not and, accordingly, the legislation authorized 
the demolition of his home. The Court unanimously held that Cooper 
was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the Board’s 
demolition decision, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation was silent 
on the process to be afforded to individuals. Notably, Chief Justice Erle 
refused to rest his judgment solely on a characterization of the decision as 
“judicial.”67 It is this rejection of categorization and embrace of a broader 
notion of fairness that is said to be the precursor to the contemporary 
Canadian duty of fairness. 
The Chief Justice’s reasons focus on the significant power exercised by 
the Board and the lack of harm that would come from the Board “hearing 
the party before they subjected him to a loss so serious.”68 There is a clear 
connection here with the first deliberative condition: respect for Cooper’s 
responsible agency. None of the judges viewed the requirement of fairness 
as a mere procedural formality. Justices Willes and Byles added that the 
absence of notice thwarted entirely Cooper’s ability to contest the adverse 
decision (before demolition) using the appeals mechanisms set out in the 
statute.69 By denying him the opportunity to actively accept or contest 
the decision, Cooper was treated as a recipient of a command and not a 
responsible agent capable of participating in the decision-making process.
A closer reading of Cooper reveals the Court’s commitment to the two 
further conditions for deliberation. Cooper was owed a duty of fairness 
because of his interests at stake and also because he might have had 
something relevant and useful to contribute to the decision to be made. The 
judges had in mind an administrative process that fosters mutual respect. 
That is, they had an expectation that both the Board and Cooper would 
approach the process as an opportunity for forming reasonable positions 
in light of the statutory scheme. For example, the Chief Justice speculated 
that perhaps “[t]he default in sending notice… is a default which may be 
explained.”70 It is not simply that Cooper will assert his right or interest 
in his private property, but rather that he might put forth good reasons for 
avoiding the demolition that are relevant to the statutory scheme.
Justice Krating states this expectation even more strongly and connects 
it to an obligation on the part of the Board. He suggests that if Cooper 
67. Cooper, supra note 64 at 418.
68. Ibid at 417-418.
69. Ibid at 419-420.
70. Ibid at 417.
880 The Dalhousie Law Journal
had the opportunity to assure the Board that construction proceeded in 
a manner that protected the public interest, “can any one suppose for a 
moment that the board would have proceeded to inflict upon the man the 
grievous injury of demolishing his house[?]”71 Justice Krating articulates a 
commitment to reflexivity. That is, requiring Cooper’s participation in the 
process implies that the Board would be willing to adjust its decision in 
accordance with the information and views presented by Cooper. 
This closer read of Cooper suggests that the duty of fairness is not 
simply concerned with protecting private rights from state interference. 
Rather, the duty of fairness is concerned with good administration. The 
Chief Justice reasons that a common law duty of fairness is “required by a 
due consideration for the public interest” and that it provides “a great many 
advantages which might arise in the way of public order.”72 While Chief 
Justice Erle does not explicate his meaning here, the reasons as a whole 
suggest that the public interest and public order is best served through 
commitments to responsible agency, mutual respect, and reflexivity. On 
this view, the private interests of Cooper are not pitted against the public 
interest in proper sewage management and urban development. Rather, a 
fair process is one in which affected parties offer public-regarding reasons 
to a respectful and open-minded decision-maker. This interpretation—one 
that contains the deliberative conditions—plausibly supplies a theory that 
underpins the decision’s undefined objective of “substantial justice.”73 
The principles of fairness articulated in Cooper laid largely dormant 
in Canadian administrative law until the 1979 SCC decision in Nicholson 
v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commission,74 in which a majority 
of the Court supplemented the narrow common law doctrine of natural 
justice with a broader duty of fairness. The Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed Nicholson, and the existence of the broader duty of fairness, six 
years later in Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution.75 
But it is the Court’s 1999 decision in Baker that is widely understood 
to unlock the potential of the duty of fairness and that brings Canadian 
law full circle to Cooper.76 The decision at issue was the denial of Baker’s 
exemption from deportation requirements. Baker had been allowed to 
make full written submissions to the decision-maker, with supporting 
71. Ibid at 420.
72. Ibid at 418.
73. Ibid.
74. Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 SCR 311, 88 DLR 
(3d) 671.
75. Cardinal, supra note 59. 
76. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v. 
Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 195.
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documentation and assistance from legal counsel. After receiving the 
adverse decision, Baker’s counsel requested reasons and received the notes 
of a junior immigration officer involved in the decision-making process. 
The notes were riddled with stereotypes and prejudice against Baker, a 
Jamaican woman with a mental health condition and children in care. The 
Court unanimously held that the participatory rights afforded to Baker and 
her children were adequate, but that the decision was biased.77 A majority 
of the Court also found the decision substantively unreasonable.78
There is abundant scholarship noting the remarkable features of 
Baker.79 Here, I note only two of the striking features of the majority’s 
reasons. First, the decision extends procedural protections to those whose 
interests are affected by the decision. The Court is clear that the duty is not 
solely about protecting the individual rights and liberties of those directly 
subject to state action. Baker, the subject of the decision, was owed a duty 
of fairness, but so were her children.80 The children’s best interests were at 
stake and those interests were entitled to full and fair consideration. Thus the 
decision-maker was required to provide an opportunity for the children’s 
views to be fully and fairly presented and to consider these submissions 
in making the decision.81 In this way, there are echoes of Cooper, in that 
the duty of fairness is not simply about mediating the conflict between 
individual and state, but rather, it is about ensuring a broader notion of 
substantial justice. The duty of fairness goes hand-in-hand with public 
order because it ensures that the interests of those impacted—whether the 
subject of the decision or not—are considered and taken into account. In 
this way, the Court inched the common law doctrine closer to the public’s 
right to be heard, which is codified in EA statutes.
Second, Baker recognizes that the duty of fairness requires decision-
makers to offer reasons for their decisions in a wide range of instances.82 
This reason-giving requirement encapsulates the conditions of mutual 
respect, responsible agency, and reflexivity. It is through giving reasons 
that the decision-maker shows respect for those affected by the decision; 
it shows that the decision-maker has taken seriously their interests; and it 
77. Baker, supra note 63 at paras 34, 78.
78. Ibid at para 76.
79. See eg David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, supra note 76; David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of 
Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Alyssa Clutterbuck, “Rethinking Baker: A Critical Race 
Feminist Theory of Disability” (2015) 20 Appeal 51.
80. Baker, supra note 63 at paras 30, 34.
81. Ibid at para 22. 
82. Ibid at para 43.
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provides those affected the opportunity to exercise their agency in either 
accepting or contesting the decision. 
The reason-giving requirement erodes the distinction between 
procedural and substantive justice.83 The obligation to provide reasons is 
a matter of procedural fairness, but is closely linked to concerns about 
the substance, or contents, of the reasons offered in support of a decision. 
The Baker majority observed that reasons can lead to better decisions by 
forcing the decision-maker to think through the rationale. In addition, the 
majority noted that reasons facilitate judicial scrutiny.84 This proved true 
in Baker: the decision was found unreasonable because the notes revealed 
the decision was “completely dismissive of the interests of Ms. Baker’s 
children,” contrary to the statutory scheme.85 
Implicit in the majority’s reasoning is concern for deliberative 
conditions. Baker may have made submissions, as a responsible agent, 
but she was not treated with respect by the decision-maker. The notes 
demonstrated that the decision was influenced by the immigration officer’s 
prejudice. Moreover, the notes revealed the absence of reflexivity, or, a 
willingness on the part of the decision-maker to be persuaded by better 
reason. Here, the decision advanced a preconceived position, riddled as it 
was with stereotypes and prejudice. It was not responsive to the concerns 
advanced by those affected. 
This part has highlighted that, among many important features of 
Baker, the decision re-articulates a robust understanding of fairness seen 
in the much earlier decision in Cooper. The duty of fairness relied upon 
by both courts implicitly contains conditions for deliberative decision-
making. The duty of fairness requires that those impacted by the decision 
be treated as responsible agents capable of participating in the decision-
making and law-making process. Respect for those affected means a 
“meaningful opportunity” to be heard and to have their claims “fully 
and fairly considered.”86 It also means that participants have a reciprocal 
obligation to provide relevant, public-regarding reasons for their claims. 
Finally, respect for the agency of those affected requires the decision-
maker to be reflexive, that is, open to persuasion and responsive to the 
reasons advanced by those affected.
83. Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 76.
84. Baker, supra note 63 at para 39.
85. Ibid at para 65.
86. Ibid at para 32.
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2. Regulation: early Canadian EA
a. EA as public inquiry in miniature
Along with the common law duty of fairness, early EA regulation and 
practice informs our understanding of modern EA law. One of the most 
significant assessments in Canadian history is the Mackenzie Valley 
Pipeline Inquiry. Transformative both domestically87 and internationally,88 
and an early precursor to modern EA and the DCA, the 1974–1977 inquiry 
assessed the impacts of a proposed oil and gas corridor in Canada’s north. 
Justice Thomas Berger led the inquiry. As this part shows, his innovative 
implementation of the inquiry influenced early Canadian EA regulation 
and fulfilled the three deliberative conditions of responsible agency, 
mutual respect, and reflexivity. 
The Inquiry’s terms of reference mirrored the set of considerations 
now associated with EA.89 Berger grasped the stakes of this proposal and 
his mandate in leading the inquiry. “[I]mplicit in this mandate,” Berger 
wrote, is that the inquiry “is not simply a debate about a gas pipeline 
and an energy corridor, it is a debate about the future of the North and 
its peoples.”90 Given these stakes, he described his “anxiety” to ensure 
“that the people of the North and all other Canadians with an interest in 
the work of the Inquiry should have every opportunity to be heard.”91 He 
wrote, “[w]e wished to create an Inquiry without walls.”92 
Berger was empowered to hold hearings, summon witnesses, compel 
the production of documents, and “to adopt such practices and procedures 
for all purposes of the inquiry as he from time to time deems expedient 
for the proper conduct thereof.”93 But there was no specific legislated 
requirement or judicial precedent for the practices and procedures that 
Berger adopted. Instead, Berger adopted innovative and celebrated 
methods94 following the lead of northern communities. 
87. Frances Abele, “The Lasting Impact of the Berger Inquiry into the Construction of a Pipeline in 
the Mackenzie Valley” in Gregory J Inwood & Carolyn M Johns, eds, Commissions of Inquiry and 
Policy Change: A Comparative Analysis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) 88 at 90.
88. Notably its influence on the design and operation of the Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand/
Aotearoa: Kim Stanton, Truth Commissions and Public Inquiries: Addressing Historical Injustices in 
Established Democracies (SJD  Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2010) at 212-213. 
89. Mandate Letter, PC 1974-641, (21 March 1974), C Gaz II [Mandate Letter].
90. Thomas R Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley 
Pipeline Inquiry (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 1977) at 1 [Inquiry].
91. Ibid at 241.
92. Ibid at 228.
93. Mandate Letter, supra note 89.
94. Stanton, supra note 88 at 151; Robert Page, Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), Chapter 5;  Abele, supra note 87 at 89; Alastair R Lucas, 
“The Berger Inquiry and the Committee for Justice and Liberty Case” in William A Tilleman & 
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In particular, the Inquiry made community participation central to 
the entire endeavour. The inquiry was structured with both community 
hearings and formal hearings with technical experts, and with mechanisms 
to ensure participants all had access to the same information.95 The two 
sets of hearings were run as complementary processes and given an 
equal role in the inquiry.96 Berger successfully sought and implemented a 
funding program for those who would make a “necessary and substantial 
contribution” and who would not otherwise have the financial resources 
to participate.97 Moreover, the hearings travelled to the communities 
and adopted informal and flexible procedures that avoided unnecessary 
adversarial, legal techniques.98 
The Inquiry attained another distinctive achievement: it produced 
a best-selling final report.99 The report details the careful attention to 
process and it arrives at a creative compromise in its recommendation—
the clear product of the process. Berger recommended that no pipeline 
should be built across the uniquely vulnerable Northern Yukon and, while 
it was environmentally feasible to build a pipeline through the Mackenzie 
Valley, it should be postponed for ten years to allow for the government to 
negotiate land claims with the Indigenous Peoples in the north.100 
The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry remains the gold standard 
for assessment that many have relied on to advocate for more inclusive 
and comprehensive planning processes for land and resource decision-
making.101 Despite never being fully replicated, the Inquiry influenced 
the structure of early Canadian EA regulation. The first federal policy 
on EA, the Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP), was 
issued the same year that Berger was given his mandate. The 1974 EARP 
contained the objective of “giving environmental problems the same 
degree of consideration as that given to economic, social, engineering and 
other concerns,” but it did not incorporate a significant role for public 
participation.102 The Inquiry, however, galvanized public interest in EA, 
Alastair R Lucas, eds, Litigating Canada’s Environment: Leading Canadian Environmental Cases by 
the Lawyers Involved (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 69.
95. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 224.
96. Stanton, supra note 88 at 167.
97. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 225-226. 
98. Ibid at 226-227.
99. Stanton, supra note 88 at 182 (and footnotes therein).
100. Inquiry, supra note 90 at xxvi-xxvii (Letter to the Minister).
101. Robert B Gibson & Kevin S Hanna, “Progress and Uncertainty: The Evolution of Federal 
Environmental Assessment in Canada” in Kevin S Hanna, ed, Environmental Impact Assessment: 
Practice and Participation, 3rd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2016) 15 at 19.
102. Provisions of the Policy of the Government of Canada Establishing the Federal Environmental 
Assessment and Review Process (Ottawa: Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office, 
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generated criticism of the original EARP, and resulted in policy changes. 
These changes emphasized the role of public participation throughout the 
assessment process and strengthened the independence of public panel 
reviews.103
Implementation of the EARP was uneven, but updates continued 
to strengthen its language. By 1984, when the EARP was formalized 
as a “Guidelines Order” (EARPGO), a legally-binding regulation,104 
it included several of Berger’s participatory innovations. EARPGO 
documents emphasized the role of public participation at all stages of 
environmental assessment.105 Panel reviews (what were and remain 
the most comprehensive form of assessment for larger projects) were 
designed to make public participation central to the exercise.106 Emulating 
the Inquiry’s community hearings, and the understanding that public 
participation must be actively facilitated, the EARPGO required that 
“[a]ll hearings of a Panel shall be public hearings conducted in a non-
judicial and informal but structured manner”107 with the goal to “encourage 
the broadest public participation.”108 Multiple community hearings were 
the norm for panel reviews, with separate “issue meetings” convened for 
interested parties to address specific, controversial issues.109 Beginning 
in 1990, EA implementation was supported by a formalized participant 
funding program with criteria for eligibility similar to the those used by 
Berger.110 
The EARPGO, in some ways, seemed to conceive of panel reviews 
as miniature public inquiries. The courts agreed that facilitating public 
participation was a central objective of the EA process.111 As noted above, 
once federal EA was enacted as legislation, public participation was 
1974), ss 1(d), 5(b)(vi).
103. Doelle, supra note 12 at 8; Robert Gibson, “From Wreck Cove to Voisey’s Bay: The Evolution 
of Federal Environmental Assessment in Canada” (2002) 20:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 
151 at 154.
104. Can Wildlife Fed Inc v Can (Minister of the Environment), [1989] 3 FC 309, [1989] 4 WWR 526 
at 537-538; Oldman, supra note 9.
105. See eg The Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (Ottawa: Federal 
Environmental Assessment Review Office, 1987) at 2-3 [Guideline 1987].
106. Oldman, supra note 9.
107. Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, s 27(1) in Rodney Northey, 
The 1995 Annotated Canada Environmental Assessment Act and EARP Guidelines Order (Toronto: 
Thomson Canada, 1994).
108. Ibid at 4.
109. Environmental Assessment Panels: What they are and What they do (Ottawa, Government of 
Canada, Environmental Assessment Review, 1980) at 7; Guideline 1987, supra note 105 at 4.
110. Northey, supra note 107 at 577.
111. Ibid.
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entrenched as one of its core purposes.112 The Inquiry had made its imprint 
on early EA regulation. As the next section argues, the Inquiry’s design 
met the three conditions of deliberative decision-making.
b.	 The	deliberative	features	of	the	inquiry	and	its	influence
Berger understood the Inquiry as an exercise in deliberative democracy, 
one that cultivated social learning and shared values through the 
integration of robust participation and formal expertise. In the report, he 
wrote: “Commissions of Inquiry have begun to take on a new function: 
that of opening up issues to public discussion, of providing a forum for 
the exchange of ideas.”113 For Berger, proper process flowed from this 
understanding:
If commissions of inquiry have become an important means for public 
participation in democratic decision-making as well as an instrument to 
supply informed advice to government, it is important to consider the 
way in which inquiries are conducted and whether they have the means 
to fulfill their perceived functions.114 
Indeed, the Inquiry fulfilled the three deliberative conditions introduced 
above. It was a process that treated those affected as responsible, self-
determining agents, it afforded them respect and cultivated mutual respect 
amongst participants, and it demonstrated reflexivity. 
First, Berger’s understanding of those affected as responsible agents is 
demonstrated by how he included their input. The Inquiry did not passively 
create an opportunity for northern participation, rather it actively facilitated 
that participation. It sought to meet those affected on their terms.115 “We 
tried to bring the Inquiry to the people. This meant it was the Inquiry, 
and the representatives of the media accompanying it—not the people of 
the North—that were obliged to travel.”116 The travelling Inquiry heard 
anyone who wanted to be heard and stayed in the northern communities 
as long as it needed to stay. The Inquiry allowed those impacted to make 
submissions in their own way. It employed translators so that Indigenous 
Peoples could speak in their own languages. It shed unnecessarily formal 
and legalistic procedures.117 
Notably, this did not come at the expense of others affected by the 
decision. Berger recognized the responsible agency of those in southern 
112. CEAA 1995, supra note 56, s 4(d).
113. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 223.
114. Ibid at 224.
115. Ibid at 227.
116. Ibid at 228. 
117. Stanton, supra note 88 at 189.
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Canada as well. He took the view that those in the south deserved to 
hear and understand the anticipated impacts on the north.118 Berger 
observed, “this was a public inquiry. The things that were said were the 
public’s business….”119 He held hearings in the south.120 These hearings 
were accompanied by a sophisticated media strategy for disseminating 
information about the Inquiry.121
Berger’s commitment to mutual respect was clear through his careful 
attentiveness to how a “fair and complete” inquiry must enable the 
participation of those affected and those interests that might not otherwise 
be represented.122 He sought, in other words, to ensure that those affected 
were treated as free and equal. An independent committee provided 
scientific evidence that was available to all.123 Berger deployed non-
adversarial mechanisms for disclosure of documents so they were available 
to all participants.124 He provided participant funding.125 These procedures 
were all essential to ensure that lay participants were on equal terms with 
professionals and technical experts and to enable mutual exchange.
Berger’s insistence that “the formal hearings and the community 
hearings should be regarded as equally important parts of the same 
process”126 nicely illustrates the Inquiry’s commitment to mutual respect. 
While the procedures for each set of hearings were tailored to the particular 
focus (community knowledge and experience versus technical expertise), 
the two were held concurrently and were mutually informing. Berger 
noted “[t]he contributions of ordinary people were… important in the 
assessment of even the most technical subjects.”127 Indigenous knowledge 
of the land was integral to assessing impacts on caribou, the vulnerability 
of the Beaufort Sea to oil spills, and the effect of frost heave on pipeline 
construction and operation.128 Reflecting the generative potential of 
deliberation, Berger concluded: “It became increasingly obvious that the 
issue of impact assessment is much greater than the sum of its constituent 
parts.”129 
118. Ibid at 172.
119. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 228.
120. Ibid. 
121. Stanton, supra note 88 at 172.
122. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 225.
123. Ibid at 224-225.
124. Ibid at 225.
125. Ibid at 225-226.
126. Ibid at 243.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid at 227.
129. Ibid.
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Finally, Berger’s commitment to reflexivity was demonstrated 
throughout his detailed report, which captured distinctive perspectives 
of the north as “homeland” and as “frontier.” Reflexivity was also 
demonstrated through Berger’s interpretation of the Inquiry mandate to 
allow for the consideration of Indigenous land claims. Early in the process 
the Inuit, Métis, and Dene advanced the position that there could be no 
approval of a pipeline right-of-way until land settlement agreements were 
concluded with the Crown.130 Berger understood this claim to be “an 
essential focus for the natives’ case regarding the impact of the pipeline 
and their way of life.”131 The process that he adopted was responsive to 
this central concern. He interpreted his mandate to allow for consideration 
of whether the pipeline could be “built without prejudice to the settlement 
of native land claims.”132 After hearing all the evidence, Berger concluded 
that it could not and, thus, recommended a 10-year moratorium on 
pipeline development in the Mackenzie Valley to allow for settlement 
negotiations.133
While EA legislation has changed considerably over time, the historical 
context of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and its influence on early 
EA regulatory structure helps explain the centrality of public participation 
to EA and the unwavering public expectation and demand for robust 
inclusion in these processes. Moreover, as we have seen, this early history 
demonstrates a real attention to the deliberative conditions of responsible 
agency, mutual respect, and reflexivity through innovative regulatory 
design. 
3. Constitutional law: The duty to consult and accommodate
a. EA as framework for the duty to consult and accommodate
The third public law frame that clarifies EA legislation is its role as one of 
the main statutory regimes for implementing the DCA. While the DCA is 
a constitutional obligation owed by the Crown, the SCC has readily and 
repeatedly endorsed the use of statutory regimes, such as EA legislation, to 
fulfill this obligation to Indigenous Peoples.134 This section explains how 
EA and the DCA are connected legally and in implementation.
130. Ibid at 244.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid at 198.
134. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 
74 at para 2 [TRTFN]; CR, supra note 14 at paras 30-33 (addressing the related statutory process for 
assessment under the Canadian Oil and Gas Operations Act); Chippewas of the Thames First Nation 
v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 at paras 32-34 [Chippewas].
The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern 889
Environmental Assessment Law
The DCA doctrine is highly contextual, tailored to the specific impacts 
of specific Crown action on specific Aboriginal groups. It therefore has 
multiple legal steps. First, the Crown must determine if the DCA is 
triggered. The duty is engaged “when the Crown has knowledge, real or 
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and 
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”135 When engaged, 
the Crown must next determine the scope of the duty owed. The Court 
describes “the scope of the duty [as] proportionate to a preliminary 
assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right 
or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the 
right or title claimed.”136 This second step requires the Crown to conduct 
a strength of claim analysis and share this information with the affected 
Aboriginal group.137 The third step is consultation itself, discussed in more 
depth below. A minimal DCA involves Crown notice and disclosure of 
information. Deep consultation, however, involves robust engagement 
“aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution.”138 Finally, the Court 
states that in some circumstances consultation will lead to accommodation, 
which requires the Crown to “[take] steps to avoid irreparable harm or to 
minimize the effects of infringement.”139
Craik observes that there is a “pragmatic attractiveness” to treating 
EA and the DCA as complementary, “since much of the information 
and analysis of the environmental effects of a proposed activity will be 
required to assess the impacts of that same activity on Aboriginal rights and 
interests.”140 Information collected through the EA informs the Crown’s 
determination of the scope of the duty, forms the basis for discussions 
with Aboriginal groups during the consultation and suggests possibilities 
for accommodation (usually in the form of mitigation measures.)141 
Conversely, the sharing of Indigenous knowledge and expertise through the 
consultation should inform the Crown’s understanding of the environmental 
and social impacts of the proposed project and the application of the legal 
tests required under EA legislation.142 
135. Haida, supra note 7 at para 35.
136. Ibid at para 39.
137. Wii’litswx v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 BCSC 1139; Saugeen First Nation v 
Ontario (MNRF), 2017 ONSC 3456 at para 61; Gitxaala, supra note 24 at paras 305-308. 
138. Haida, supra note 7 at paras 43-44.
139. Ibid at para 47. For a detailed analysis of the DCA see Dwight G Newman, Revisiting the Duty 
to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon, SK: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2014) at 27-28.
140. Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 633.
141. See eg the phased approach used for the Trans Mountain Pipeline assessment: Tsleil-Waututh 
Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153 at paras 74-75 [TWN]. 
142. See TRTFN, supra note 134.
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In addition to practical overlap, EAs are themselves Crown conduct 
that trigger the DCA. This is true of decisions made throughout the EA 
process, from high-level scoping EA decisions143 to final decisions on 
project approval. It is also true of decisions made by government agencies144 
as well as Ministers and Governor in Council.145  Moreover, the BC Court 
of Appeal has held that, given the significance of EA decision-making for 
land and resource management, EA must include Aboriginal consultation, 
even if there is a separate process for engaging with affected Aboriginal 
groups.146 EA and the DCA are legally intertwined.147
The Crown also views these processes as necessarily interconnected, 
which is reflected in federal and provincial policy guidance: “since 2006, 
the Government of Canada has relied, to the extent possible, on the 
federal environmental assessment process to fulfill the duty to consult and 
accommodate, as appropriate.”148 Canada has produced numerous policy 
documents to guide Indigenous “participation” in EA.149 Similarly, BC 
policy documents presume integration between EA and the DCA.150 
143. CS, supra note 15 at paras 44, 47; Kwikwetlem First Nation v British Columbia (Utilities 
Commission), 2009 BCCA 68 at para 70.
144. CR, supra note 14 at para 29; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Nova Scotia (Utility and Review 
Board), 2019 NSCA 66 at paras 101-103.
145. See eg Gitxaala, supra note 24.
146. Nlaka’pamux	Nation	 Tribal	 Council	 v	 British	 Columbia	 (Environmental	Assessment	Office),	
2011 BCCA 78 at paras 97-98.
147. See Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 for a detailed analysis of these interconnections.
148. Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Policy Context: Assessment of Potential Impacts on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 15 January 2020), online: 
Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-
guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/assessment-potential-impacts-rights-indigenous-
peoples.html>  [https://perma.cc/LT8M-DNQ9].
149. Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Interim Guidance: Indigenous Participation in Impact 
Assessment” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 16 December 2019), online: Government of Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-guidance/practitioners-
guide-impact-assessment-act/interim-guidance-indigenous-participation-ia.html> [https://perma.
cc/DCP7-56Q5] [“Indigenous Participation”]; Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Interim Policy 
Context: Indigenous Participation in Impact Assessment” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 27 
August 2019), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/
services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/interim-policy-indigenous-
participation-ia.html> [https://perma.cc/US6L-R2V7]; Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, 
“Interim Guidance: Collaboration with Indigenous Peoples in Impact Assessments” (Ottawa: Impact 
Assessment Agency, 16 January 2020), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/
en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-
act/collaboration-indigenous-peoples-ia.html> [https://perma.cc/PJ5W-S3HQ] [“Indigenous 
Collaboration”]; Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Interim Guidance: Assessment of Potential 
Impacts on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 16 January 2020), 
online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/
policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/interim-guidance-assessment-potential-
impacts-rights-indigenous-peoples.html> [https://perma.cc/B6RE-MBTP].
150. British Columbia, Environmental Assessment Office, Guide to Involving Proponents when 
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The apparent complementarity between EA and the DCA often breaks 
down in practice, however, giving rise to complex and highly contextual 
disputes and legal issues. For example, despite the Crown’s reliance on 
EA for DCA purposes, the process of the EA is often defined to exclude 
matters of crucial import to Indigenous Peoples and the exercise of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.151 Aspects of the DCA get parcelled out 
across government actors,152 creating tension with Aboriginal groups who 
are prevented from effectively conversing with decision-makers about 
their concerns.153 Government agencies fail to fulfill the DCA because they 
confuse essential distinctions between environmental impacts and impacts 
on Aboriginal rights.154 And ambiguity remains over whether Aboriginal 
groups, government, or industry proponents bear the onus of substantiating 
concerns about anticipated environmental impacts that impinge proven or 
claimed Aboriginal or treaty rights.155 
The on-the-ground operation of EA as a framework for the DCA 
is highly complex and often fraught. As described in next section, the 
courts have nonetheless developed and enforced a set of legal obligations 
governing the exercise of public authority in these contexts. Moreover, 
the judicially-developed DCA recognizes—albeit incompletely—the three 
conditions of deliberative decision-making.
b. The deliberative features of the duty to consult and accommodate
This section identifies the strongest attributes of the DCA and their 
deliberative potential, while recognizing that, even in its best light, the 
DCA is highly constrained.156 Indeed the close connection between EA 
and the DCA in practice may contribute to the DCA’s narrowness. When 
combined with EA, affected Aboriginal and treaty rights are framed as 
simply another set of inputs for the assessment, rather than the impetus for 
coproduction of knowledge and shared decision-making. EA thus helps to 
Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process (Victoria: Environmental 
Assessment Office, December 2013), online (pdf): <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/
natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/first-nations/proponents_guide_fn_
consultation_environmental_assessment_process_dec2013.pdf>  [https://perma.cc/WP8M-ZKWR]; 
British Columbia, Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation, Guide to Involving Proponents 
when Consulting First Nations (Victoria: Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation, 
December 2014), online (pdf): <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-
stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/first-nations/involving_proponents_guide_when_
consulting_with_first_nations.pdf> [https://perma.cc/P5H8-SEYP].
151. See eg TWN, supra note 141 (on the exclusion of marine shipping).
152. See Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 665.
153. See eg Gitxaala, supra note 24 at para 279; TWN, supra note 141 at para 562.
154. CR, supra note 14 at para 45.
155. Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 5§2020-2030.
156. Christie, supra note 8 at 154; Hanson, supra note 8 at 12-13. 
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position the DCA alongside the other two public law frames as a decision-
making procedure within Canadian public law, rather than as a rights-
affirming doctrine with the potential to mediate across legal orders.157
It is possible, nonetheless, to see the courts articulating and actively 
developing deliberative conditions in the DCA doctrine, even though they 
often stop well short of giving them full effect. This section draws out 
those deliberative conditions from the SCC’s formative decision in Haida 
and surrounding DCA jurisprudence. In addition, it highlights an example 
of how these deliberative conditions have been misunderstood by the 
courts. This example underscores the importance of making explicit the 
conditions on which the court relies to guide its understanding of DCA. 
The Court’s description of consultation shares the basic features 
of deliberation introduced in Part I. Haida defines consultation in the 
following terms: “‘[C]onsultation’ in its least technical definition is 
talking together for mutual understanding.”158 The Court adopts from 
New Zealand policy the idea that “[c]onsultation is not just a process 
of exchanging information. It also entails testing and being prepared to 
amend policy proposals in the light of information received, and providing 
feedback.”159 It describes a reciprocal relationship in which participants 
engage in a search for a reasonable outcome that takes into account the 
reasons and views of each other. Consultation, as described in Haida, is 
not a one-way transfer of information from one party to another. Nor is 
it a straight-forward balancing of fixed preferences of the participants. 
Rather consultation, on this view, is potentially transformative, where 
the outcomes generated from the consultation are a unique product of the 
process.160 
The deliberative condition of responsible agency is encapsulated by 
the Crown’s obligation to consult with Indigenous Peoples in their unique 
capacity as claimants of Aboriginal and treaty rights.161 The DCA cannot be 
fulfilled by treating Indigenous Peoples simply as another stakeholder in a 
decision with broader public consequences. Haida clarifies that Indigenous 
Peoples are entitled to a decision-making process that is distinctive from 
what the ordinary duty of fairness requires and that may generate different 
157. See Hamilton & Nichols, supra note 8 for a proposal on how the DCA could transform into this.
158. Haida, supra note 7 at para 43, quoting Thomas Isaac & Anthony Knox, “The Crown’s Duty to 
Consult Aboriginal People” (2003) 41:1 Alta L Rev 49 at 61; CR, supra note 14 at para 49.
159. Haida, supra note 7 at para 46, quoting New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, A Guide for 
Consultation with Mäori (Wellington:The Ministry, 1997).
160. Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 673.
161. Haida, supra note 7 at para 51; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at para 64 [Mikisew].
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outcomes than ordinary equitable remedies such as interim injunctions.162 
This flows from the distinctive stakes in land and resource decisions for 
Indigenous Peoples.163 This distinctiveness is again recognized by the 
Court when it holds that fulfilling the duty to consult is “a special public 
interest that supersedes other concerns.”164  
The commitment to mutual respect between Crown and Indigenous 
Peoples flows from the honour of the Crown.165 At its core, the honour 
of the Crown seems to entail a stance of respect for Indigenous Peoples 
in Canada.166 For example, communication by the Crown to Indigenous 
Peoples must foster mutual understanding.167 Respect is also required in 
that the Crown has a clear and legally-enforceable obligation to conduct a 
strength of claim analysis and to share that information with the affected 
Aboriginal group.168 The strength of claim analysis ensures that Crown 
consultation is tailored to the specific impacts on the individual Aboriginal 
group. Sharing that information creates the platform for fostering dialogue, 
recognized within the existing doctrinal frame.169
Moreover, Haida is clear that this respect must be mutual: “At all 
stages, good faith on both sides is required.”170 Hard bargaining is 
acceptable, according to the Court, when it takes place within the broader 
understanding of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown. The vision 
presented by the Court reflects deliberative theories that value plural 
modes of reason giving and moments of bargaining or rhetoric, provided 
they take place within a broader commitment of the parties to deliberative 
democracy.171 
Implicit in the Haida definition of consultation is the condition of 
reflexivity. Because consultation is not simply the exchange of information 
or, as the Court later states, “an opportunity to blow off steam,”172 Crown 
decision-makers have an obligation to revise decisions in light of the 
consultation process. For deep consultation, the Federal Court of Appeal 
has stated that “a dialogue must ensue and the dialogue should lead to a 
demonstrably serious consideration of accommodation. The Crown must 
162. Haida, supra note 7 at para 13.
163. Ibid at para 7.
164. CR, supra note 14 at para 40.
165. Newman, supra note 139 at 27-28. 
166. Ibid at 167.
167. CR, supra note 14 at para 49.
168. Supra note 137. 
169. Gitxaala, supra note 24 at paras 308-309.
170. Haida, supra note 7 at para 42.
171. Chambers, supra note 28 at 309, 322.
172. Mikisew, supra note 161 at para 54; West Moberly First Nation v British Columbia (Chief 
Inspector of Mines), 2011 BCCA 247 at para 149 [WMFN].
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be prepared to make changes to its proposed actions.”173 While Haida is 
clear that consultative obligations are varied and that the requirement of 
accommodation may not always arise, it is equally clear that the “common 
thread on the Crown’s part must be ‘the intention of substantially addressing 
[Aboriginal] concerns’ as they are raised…through a meaningful process 
of consultation.”174 
Reflexivity is further presumed by the requirement that consultation 
occur at the stage that can actually influence the outcome. In Haida, the 
Court determined that “to be meaningful,” consultation must take place 
on higher-level, strategic decisions which set the course for subsequent 
operational decisions.175 At least for major projects, this has been extended 
to consultation on the macro-level design of the EA process itself.176 
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that early consultation is essential, 
otherwise “there is clear momentum to allow a project.”177
The condition of reflexivity is enforced through the obligation to give 
reasons for the decision. Reason giving is a crucial expression of respect 
for the receiving party, which has added significance in the Crown’s 
process of reconciliation. As the SCC has stated: 
Written reasons foster reconciliation by showing affected Indigenous  
[P]eoples that their rights were considered and addressed… Reasons 
are ‘a sign of respect [which] displays the requisite comity and courtesy 
becoming the Crown as Sovereign toward a prior occupying [N]ation’… 
Written reasons also promote better decision making.178
The Court ends this passage with a nod to the internal substantive 
constraints of reason giving. Not just any reasons will fulfill the 
Crown’s obligations. The courts have held in this context that reasons 
must show that “representations are seriously considered and, wherever 
possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action.”179 
173. TWN, supra note 141 at para 564.
174. Haida, supra note 7 at para 42, quoting Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at 
para 168, 153 DLR (4th) 193.
175. Haida, supra note 7 at para 76.
176. Dene Tha’ First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment), 2006 FC 1354 at para 107.
177. The Squamish Nation et al v The Minister of Sustainable Resource Management et al, 2004 
BCSC 1320 at para 74.
178. CR, supra note 14 at para 41, citing to Haida, supra note 7 at para 44; Kainaiwa/Blood Tribe v 
Alberta (Energy), 2017 ABQB 107 at para 117 and Baker, supra note 63 at para 39. See also WMFN, 
supra note 172 at para 148, where the BCCA puts it a bit more plainly, stating WMFN was entitled 
to “a satisfactory, reasoned explanation as to why their position was not accepted”; Squamish First 
Nation v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2019 FCA 216 at paras 64, 75-79 [Squamish 2019].
179. Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 1999 BCCA 470 at para 
160, adopted in Mikisew 2005, supra note 161 at 64; applied in WMFN, supra note 172 at paras 145-
146. 
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An obligation to show that the concerns of Aboriginal groups have been 
integrated into the decision provides at least a baseline substantive test 
for the DCA.180 Demonstrable integration is consistent with the dialogic 
nature of consultation that the Court in Haida seems to have in mind 
and that is picked up explicitly in later decisions by the Federal Court of 
Appeal, which demand of the Crown responsive reasons.181 At its best, the 
DCA encapsulates the three deliberative conditions and, like deliberative 
decision-making, fuses procedural and substantive demands.182
While the three deliberative conditions are immanent in DCA 
jurisprudence, they are imperfectly realized.183 For example, the courts 
repeatedly invoke the statement that consultation does not create “a veto 
over what can be done with land.”184 In this way the DCA mirrors the 
common law duty of fairness and the distinction between process and 
substance sustained in the common law.185 
The deliberative conditions indicate that the veto language is 
inappropriate. While it is true that deliberative decision-making means no 
one substantive outcome can be presupposed in advance,186 it is inaccurate 
to describe this as a veto. Rather it is a deliberative constraint that applies to 
all participants in the decision-making process, including the Crown. Thus 
the Courts must distinguish between general deliberative conditions and 
the specific case. A deliberative understanding of the DCA likely requires 
the outcome in some	 specific instances to resemble a veto in that the 
deliberative process results in the Crown adopting an Aboriginal group’s 
position whole cloth. In such a case, as Christie puts it, this “may appear 
180. Nigel Bankes, “Little Salmon and the Juridical Nature of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate” 
(10 December 2010), online (blog): ABlawg <https://ablawg.ca/2010/12/10/little-salmon-and-the-
juridical-nature-of-the-duty-to-consult-and-accommodate/> [https://perma.cc/6UBY-5EPH].
181. Gitxaala, supra note 24 at para 279; TWN, supra note 141 at paras 502, 559, 563; Squamish 
2019, supra note 178 at paras 63-64. But see Hanson, supra note 8 at 22-23.
182. Mary Liston, “Transubstantiation in Canadian Public Law: Processing Substance and 
Instantiating Process” in John Bell, Mark Elliot, Jason NE Varuhas & Philip Murray, eds, Public 
Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) 
213. The requirement of accommodation, articulated by the Supreme Court as arising only in some 
instances, is hard to square with the more deliberative aspects of the Court’s reasons. If consultation is 
a dialogue conducted in good faith, as the Court states, then accommodation should be part-and-parcel 
of that dialogue. 
183. As opposed to the incoherence that arises from the assertion of Crown sovereignty over pre-
existing legal systems, which is nicely illustrated by Christie’s retelling (Christie, supra note 8 at 
155-157).
184. Haida, supra note 7 at para 48. This language is repeated in numerous cases. See eg: Gitxaala, 
supra note 24 at para 179; Chippewas, supra note 134 at para 59; Prophet River First Nation v British 
Columbia (Environment), 2017 BCCA 58 at para 65.
185. Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 674.
186. See, eg, Chambers, supra note 28 at 309 (willingness to revise preference is a key distinction 
between deliberation and other forms of talk).
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to the observer that Aboriginal [N]ations are exercising veto powers, [but] 
what is actually transpiring is the restraint of Crown power.”187 Attending 
to these deliberative conditions means that the Crown must be prepared to 
reject some major projects, at least in some instances, where the concerns 
of Aboriginal groups are so serious as to persuade the Crown to change its 
position. And the Crown must be open to such persuasion.188
This part has shown that this restraint of Crown power flows from 
the deliberative conditions contained elsewhere in the DCA. As discussed 
in Part I, these deliberative conditions are grounded in a theory that 
explains how the exercise of public power can have legal and democratic 
authority within the Canadian legal system.189 Making explicit the implicit 
deliberative conditions contained in the DCA would allow courts to give 
full effect to the DCA.
This part has clarified EA law using three public law frames: EA as 
procedural fairness for the public, EA as public inquiry and EA as framework 
for the DCA. In addition, it has argued that these three public law frames 
contain three essential conditions for deliberative decision-making. While 
implicit and not always fully realized, each of these areas of public law 
nonetheless recognizes the responsible agency of those affected, seeks 
to foster mutual respect, and requires reflexivity. Elucidating these three 
shared deliberative conditions explains how the deliberative aspirations 
of EA are immanent in the public law backdrop which informs its modern 
legislative form.
3. Modern environmental assessment law reform
Reforms to BC and Canada’s EA legislation underscore the need to 
clarify the public law context of EA law. Features such as a planning 
phase, incorporation of community knowledge, and the recognition 
of Indigenous jurisdiction all have the potential to move EA in Canada 
toward the deliberative model long supported by EA research. However, 
187. Christie, supra note 8 at 178.
188. As the BC Court of Appeal has observed, “consultation must begin with “the full range of 
possible outcomes” (WMFN, supra note 174 at para 149.) See also Blaney et al v British Columbia 
(The Minister of Agriculture Food and Fisheries) et al, 2005 BCSC 283 at para 127: “The Ministry 
is to approach this consultation with an open mind and be prepared to withdraw its approval of the 
amendment if, after reasonable consultation, it determines that it is necessary to do so…” Rejecting a 
project is noted as within the range of options in CR, supra note 14 para 32.
189. To be clear, however, this is not sufficient to bring the DCA in light with international 
commitments under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples nor is does it reflect 
nation-to-nation relationships between Canadian jurisdictions and Indigenous nations. See eg Brenda 
Gunn et al, UNDRIP Implementation: Braiding International, Domestic and Indigenous Laws, 
Special Report (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017), online: CIGI: <https://www.
cigionline.org/publications/undrip-implementation-braiding-international-domestic-and-indigenous-
laws>.
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these legislative reforms are not straight-forward; they do not simply 
codify pre-existing government obligations to engage with those affected 
by EA decisions. There is a risk that the public law connections detailed 
in Part II will remain obscured. To counter this risk, this part provides a 
brief example of a new EA reform to show how EA as procedural fairness, 
EA as public inquiry in miniature, and EA as DCA framework are merged 
and extended through this reform. It then identifies the role that shared 
deliberative conditions can and should play in providing a clear and 
coherent baseline for the implementation and interpretation of EA reforms. 
BC and Canada’s EA legislation now contain a “planning phase”190 
or “early engagement stage,”191 which begins when the EA requirements 
of the legislation are triggered by the proponent’s application. Planning or 
early engagement effectively creates a participatory process for determining 
the process. That is. it provides for input from local communities, other 
jurisdictions (Indigenous and non-Indigenous), and the public broadly on 
both the project design and the content of the EA before the assessment is 
undertaken. It precedes the assessment and ends with a determination of 
whether the proposed project should be exempted from an EA, rejected 
outright, or subject to an EA. In BC, this is one of two points in the EA 
regime in which the Agency is required to seek the consent of participating 
Indigenous Nations.192
The inclusion of mandatory planning and early engagement is a move 
toward best practices.193 Early input allows those affected to shape the 
substantive concerns to be addressed in the assessment as well as how 
they will be addressed (eg modes of continued engagement through the 
EA process and monitoring). Planning and early engagement allow for 
mutual learning between proponent, communities, and government before 
positions on specific issues become entrenched. They create opportunities 
for both the EA and the final decision to respond fully to concerns that are 
brought forward early in the process. 
In addition to EA best practice, planning and early engagement can 
also be understood as an instantiation of the three public law frames 
described above. First, like the common law duty of fairness, planning 
and early engagement guarantees those affected a right to be heard with 
“full and fair consideration”194 of their concerns. But it also extends on 
190. IAA, supra note 19 ss 10-15.
191. EAA, supra note 19 ss 13-18.
192. Ibid, s 16(1). Note that the Minister does retain ultimate decision-making power to move ahead 
even in the absence of consensus.
193. See Part I.B. supra text surrounding notes 32 to 35.
194. Baker, supra note 63 at para 32.
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the Baker requirement of “full and fair consideration” by ensuring that 
concerns are heard well before the EA and its final decision gain too much 
momentum for those concerns to be taken seriously. 
Second, the planning and early engagement reforms emulate the 
model of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, which included early 
engagement while also being flexible in the form of that engagement. 
Canada and BC’s reforms require this early stage of EA without mandating 
the specific content of planning or engagement. While this creates a risk 
of minimalist implementation, it also creates the opportunity for Agency 
leadership to require creative and deliberative early engagement that is 
responsive to local needs. As the Inquiry demonstrates, early engagement 
allows decision-makers to craft an assessment process that is responsive 
to the pressing concerns of local communities both in terms of substance 
(eg title and land negotiations) and process (eg informal and inclusive 
community hearings).
Finally, planning and early engagement are crucial parts of how the 
DCA will be operationalized for major project decisions. Canada’s interim 
guidelines outline a collaborative and consent-seeking approach with 
Indigenous Nations for the planning phase. One outcome of this stage is 
a collaboratively-designed Indigenous Engagement and Partnership Plan, 
which outlines participation, collaboration, and partnership arrangements 
between Canada and affected Indigenous Peoples.195 BC’s EAA also 
empowers the Agency to conclude partnership agreements with affected 
Indigenous Nations.196 But the provincial legislation also moves the 
Agency beyond the constitutional minimum set out in the DCA with its 
consent-seeking mandate and specific requirements to secure the consent 
of participating Indigenous Nations.197 Planning and early engagement 
thus seem to incorporate and potentially surpass the strongest aspects of 
the existing DCA by requiring dialogue and meaningful engagement on 
these strategic decisions about the nature of consultation itself. Moreover, 
the outcome of the planning and early engagement stage is a set of reasons 
that demonstrates how consensus was sought, and ideally achieved, for the 
EA process going forward. 
In sum, planning and early engagement features in the reformed EA 
legislation extend and merge aspects of the duty of fairness, regulatory 
practice, and the DCA. This means that each of these public law frames is, 
on its own, inadequate for interpreting the legal scope of the new design 
195. “Indigenous Participation,” supra note 149. See also “Indigenous collaboration,” supra note 149. 
196. EAA, supra note 19 ss 41, 43-44.
197. Ibid, s 7.
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features. Yet the deliberative conditions shared across these three public 
law frames have the potential to guide interpretation and implementation 
in a way that helps modern EA law better achieve its deliberative potential. 
The specific, nuanced requirements of these conditions must be 
worked out in light of the particularities of each case. But the deliberative 
conditions ought to prompt several questions about the administration 
of the planning or early engagement stage. For example, did this stage 
provide an inclusive opportunity for those who are affected to exercise 
their agency? As the three public law frames demonstrate, recognizing 
the responsible agency of those affected means treating engagement as a 
central part of the public decision-making process, not a formality or one 
of many inputs in a decision-making calculus.
Second, was this a planning process that was appropriately facilitative 
of the agency of those affected? That is, did it create fair and equal 
conditions for engagement by those affected? The three public law frames 
demonstrate attention to the conditions for participation. Mutual respect 
means participants and decision-makers alike must approach the process 
in the spirit of understanding, free from bias and stereotypes.198 It means 
attention to the different abilities of those affected to engage (eg timing 
and funding needs) and the different ways in which concerns will be 
communicated. 
Finally, did planning and early engagement culminate in a decision 
that was responsive to reasons presented during this stage? Again, the 
three public law frames demonstrate that reflexivity and, in particular, 
the provision of responsive and public-regarding reasons by the decision-
maker are a condition of the legitimate exercise of public authority. 
Reflexive reasons have particular importance early in the EA since their 
absence is likely to brew resentment and a lack of trust for those affected 
by the final decision.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the deliberative aspirations for EA are sourced 
in law. Contrary to dominant legal characterizations as essentially technical 
198. Two recent examples provide some context: eg, the use of security or police action to chill 
peaceful and legitimate public questioning of proposals (Frances Willick, “Province Won’t Investigate 
Rough Arrest at Gold Mine Meeting,” CBC (30 May 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
nova-scotia/john-perkins-arrest-atlantic-gold-investigation-complaint-1.5155883> [https://perma.cc/
XGX2-NWNS]), and racist blacklash directed at First Nations during provincial and federal planning 
decisions on protecting caribou (Andrew Kurjata, West Moberly First Nations Chief Denounces ‘Fear 
Mongering’ Over Caribou Protection Plan,” CBC (18 April 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbia/caribou-draft-plan-west-moberly-chief-racism-jobs-1.5102961> [https://
perma.cc/D2J2-4YKK]).
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or essentially political, this article has clarified that EA legislation can 
be explained through three public law frames. Understanding EA as 
procedural fairness for the public, public inquiry in miniature, and as a 
framework for implementing the DCA clarifies its long-standing objective 
of ensuring meaningful engagement with those affected by EA decisions. 
Moreover, a close analysis of the duty of fairness, the influence of the 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, and the DCA has revealed they contain 
three essential deliberative conditions. Each recognizes the responsible 
agency of those affected by public decisions, fosters mutual respect, and 
commits participants and decision-makers to reflexivity. These conditions 
are part of a broader theory of public authority that is realized (in part) 
through these three areas of public law.
The general contribution of this article is to show that there is a 
mutually-informing potential of environmental law and public law theory 
and doctrine. As a pillar of environmental law and the only consistent point 
of transparent and participatory environmental decision-making across 
Canada, EA law must be informed by general public law requirements. 
Conversely, as a site of recent and innovative law reform, the novel design 
features of EA legislation ought to illuminate the creative and deliberative 
potential laden in the public law doctrine.  
The article’s specific contributions have been to clarify the complex 
characteristics of EA law through the use of three more familiar public law 
frames and to show that these public law frameworks support deliberative 
EA in law, not just as policy aspiration. This public law clarification of 
EA further helps to supply an interpretive framework for novel design 
features enacted by Canada and BC. This article argues that modern EA 
provisions must be implemented and interpreted in a manner that attends 
to the responsible agency of those affected, the conditions for mutual 
respect, and the obligation of reflexivity. In this way, EA law can ensure 
that consequential decisions about the future of human and ecological 
communities fulfill the deliberative commitments immanent in Canadian 
public law.
